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Chechnya : moving toward Islamic nationalism?  
 
 
by Pénélope Larzillière 
 
Between the first Russo-Chechen war of independence (1994-96) and the 
resumption of the conflict in 1999, the range of actions employed by the 
Chechens evolved, as did the intensity of Russian army operations. While 
ambushes against the latter have remained the Chechen combatants’ principal 
mode of action, recent developments in the conflict have been marked by the 
emergence of suicide attacks. The first war ended with the signing of the 
Khassaviurt accord in August 19961, following the serious setbacks 
experienced by the Russian army. A treaty was signed in 1997 prohibiting the 
use of force in relations between the two countries. However, the situation in 
an independent Chechnya turned out to be difficult. The shattered economy left 
between 80 and 90 % of the working population jobless2. Russian promises of 
reconstruction in fact resulted in the economic isolation of Chechen territory 
through checkpoints set up all along the border. On the domestic scene, 
elections were organised in 1997. The candidates who were the most 
intransigent towards the Russians, and who had Islamist leanings, such as 
Basayev3
On the Russian side, the second war was marked by far more extensive 
bombings, village “sweeps”, the establishment of “filtration camps”, ransom-
 and Udugov (Minister of Information under President Dudayev), 
were outnumbered by Maskhadov, the head of the Chechen army known for his 
willingness to compromise and negotiate with the Russians. Yet Maskhadov 
had great difficulty in establishing his authority over the whole of Chechnya, 
with certain warlords refusing to retreat. In October 1999, Dagestani and 
Chechen Islamist combatants, led by Basayev, made an incursion into Dagestan 
in order to provide assistance to Wahhabi villages. In doing so, they gave the 
Russians an excuse to invade Chechnya again.  
                                               
1. Although the Chechen side understood the agreement as a recognition of its independence, 
the determination of Chechnya’s status was postponed until 2001. 
2. Brian Williams, “Caucasus Belli. The second Russo-Chechen war, 1999-2002. A struggle 
for freedom or sub-plot to the war on terrorism ?”, Turkistan Newsletter, 2003. 
3. A nationalist combatant during the first war, Basayev gradually developed an increasingly 
Islamist perspective, describing himself as an “Islamist Che Guevara”. 
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taking, etc. In addition to traditional guerrilla methods, in 2000 the Chechens 
began launching suicide attacks against the Russian army, as well as against the 
pro-Russian Chechen administration, for which Basayev generally claimed 
responsibility. The suicide attacks were strongly influenced by the idea of 
shahid, or Islamic ‘‘martyr”. Websites for many jihadist organizations readily 
portrayed Chechnya as one of the fronts where Muslims were being oppressed 
by kuffar, or “infidels”, in this case Russians. The Russians immediately 
highlighted this state of affairs and made a direct link between such actions and 
Al Qaida-style international terrorism. The suicide attacks, rejected by the 
people, were then presented as the result of foreign influence, i.e. the 
“Wahhabis”. Thus arose the issue of the ‘‘Palestinization’’ of the conflict, 
officially referred to for the first time in June 2003 by FSB (ex-KGB) director 
Nikolai Patrushev, as well as by certain journalists such as Anna Politovskaia4
Islamism, an Islamic nationalist reinterpretation of the national struggle? 
.  
But does the increase in suicide attacks in Chechnya mean the Chechen 
struggle has been co-opted by international jihadist movements? The theory we 
will develop here attempts to highlight the evolution of that struggle from 
nationalism to Islamic nationalism, as the discourse justifying the war is 
increasingly filled with religious references, while the issues at stake have 
remained nationalist. Such references are also historical, as they were already 
present during the anti-colonial struggles in the 19th century. Moreover, 
although the use of suicide attacks is part of the evolution towards Islamic 
nationalism, this increase in sacrificial violence cannot be attributed to the 
Islamists alone. Indeed, the latter were very present during the first Chechen 
war when such actions were not employed. Other aspects must therefore be 
included in order to understand this change. We must be careful in our analysis 
in any case, as the inaccessible terrain makes it difficult to evaluate the real 
impact of references to martyrdom on the population and groups of combatants.  
 
Although Islam has been present in the region since the 8th century, it was not 
massively established in Chechnya until the 18th, and was implanted, in the 
19th century during the Caucasus wars5
                                               
4. Note that while Palestine also appears as a front for jihad on jihadist websites, the reference 
to martyrdom that one can observe in Palestine itself has little to do with the martyrdom of 
transnational jihad, as it exists within the context of Islamic nationalism: Pénélope Larzillière, 
‘‘Palestinian ‘martyrdom’, the new face of failed nationalism’’, in Alain Dieckhoff and Rémy 
Leveau (dir.), Israéliens et Palestiniens, la guerre en partage, Paris, Balland, 2003, pp. 89-
116. As shown by Khosrokhavar, although suicide bombings are within the range of actions 
taken by Islamic nationalists and international jihadists, their frames of reference for 
justifying such actions are different: nationalism regarded as sacred in one case, and the 
transnational umma (community) of believers in the other (Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les 
Nouveaux Martyrs d’Allah, Paris, Flammarion, 2002). 
5. See Mikhaïl Roshin, ‘‘Islam in Chechnya’’, in Frédérique Longuet-Marx (dir.), 
Tchétchénie, la guerre jusqu’au dernier, Paris, Mille et Une Nuits, 2003, p. 118. 
. The relationship between Chechen 
Islam and the anti-colonial wars constitutes an important point in understanding 
how the Chechen nationalist struggle was to be linked to Islam later on. That 
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form of Islam was rooted in two Sufi brotherhoods: the Naqshbandiyya and the 
Qadiriyya. Every Chechen is associated with one of the branches of these 
brotherhoods, and members of the same clan may belong to different ones. 
These brotherhoods are also a form of social organization. Nevertheless, they 
lost a great deal of influence during the Soviet era, when Chechen society took 
part in the overall movement towards secularization. Chechen Islam, many of 
whose leaders disappeared, in particular during the deportation in 19446, gave 
up many of its political aspects at that time and was transformed through an 
emphasis on Sufi rituals and traditions such as festivals, zikr7
In addition to the emergence of jihadists
, etc. Respecting 
those rituals during the deportation played a major role in maintaining Chechen 
identity. 
8 in the Russo-Chechen conflict, which 
we will examine later on, one issue of great importance involves the response 
to Salafist religious and political ideas, in direct opposition to local Sufism. 
Two aspects played a crucial role: a generational conflict on the one hand, and 
a connection to the national struggle on the other9
Claiming a connection to Wahhabism has enabled young people to challenge 
clan-based decision-making structures. Through such references young people 
have succeeded in legitimizing their decision-making capacity. Within the 
Palestinian context, Islamism has challenged patriarchal authority by referring 
to a higher source of legitimacy and by establishing a direct reference to the 
Koran (in essence, playing the Koran off their fathers). Similarly Wahhabism, 
by challenging Sufism and especially social structures connected to it, has 
provided an opportunity for young people 
. 
 
The generational conflict 
 
10
                                               
6. On 23 February 1944, Stalin deported the Chechens to Kazakhstan, accusing them of 
collaborating with the Nazis. The memory of that deportation has remained central to the 
Chechens. 
7. A group dance accompanied by prayers and songs. 
8. By the term ‘‘jihadist’’ we are referring to international Islamist groups supporting the 
Salafist doctrine and associating it with jihadism. By ‘‘Wahhabis’’ we mean local Islamist 
groups supporting Salafism. 
9. In this regard it could prove interesting to compare it to the role played by political 
Palestinian Islam as seen in movements such as Hamas. Indeed, the identity issue serves the 
same function here of reinterpreting the national struggle and of challenging community 
decision-making structures. 
10. Chechen Committee, Tchétchénie, dix clés pour comprendre, Paris, La Découverte, 2003, 
p. 37. 
. It has highlighted a direct 
connection to God, without any intermediary religious authorities, and built a 
religious relationship which can take on a more individualistic side in certain 
contexts, beyond the highly prescriptive rules of that movement and its 
organization in more or less closed groups. Thus the Wahhabis have often 
found themselves in direct opposition to village councils. Furthermore, this 
new religious reference has gone hand-in-hand with the creation of armed 
groups, which has enabled them to impose their decisions through the use of 
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force. Lastly, in a devastated economy, these groups have provided a great deal 
of financial assistance. 
Social advancement has been possible within these movements through 
knowledge about Islam. Chechen Sufism has suffered from its failure to 
transmit such knowledge. Thus, in particular since the institution of Sharia, 
individuals with expertise on the subject of Islam – acquired over a few years 
through ad hoc training in Arab countries, including a certain familiarity with 
the language of the Koran – can attain positions upon their return that were 
previously unthinkable (president of a court, for instance). However, for the 
time being we lack sufficient information about the sociological profiles of 
those supporting Wahhabism.  
The challenge to the established order has therefore come about through the use 
of weapons, but also through this reference to knowledge, even if the latter is 
marked by intense ideology.  
 
The relationship to the national struggle 
 
A new interpretation of the national struggle has also been facilitated by the 
reference to Islamism. Indeed, during the second Russo-Chechen War some of 
the Sufi authorities – in particular Kadyrov, a former mufti and combatant – 
were gradually discredited as the war progressed and repression by the 
Russians got worse, since they had collaborated with the latter. Although the 
administration has altered certain attitudes since then, it has continued to apply 
pro-Russian policies.  
On the opposite side, combatant groups such as those led by Basayev have 
linked Islamism to the national struggle and referred to the figure of the Imam 
Shamil. The latter, who belonged to the Naqshbandi brotherhood, founded an 
independent imamate in the 19th century uniting Chechnya and Dagestan 
where he established the Sharia. He was defeated and deposed by the Russians 
in 1859.  
The rooting of Islam within the national struggle has also been achieved 
through the notions of ghazavat and jihad. While jihad refers to ‘‘the believer’s 
efforts to improve himself’’ (major or inner jihad), or to the ‘‘holy war carried 
out to defend Muslims and their lands’’ (minor or outer jihad), ghazavat 
specifically designates combat between armies11
The notion of jihad developed here is thus closely tied to references to 
independence and has only acquired real meaning for certain Chechen 
combatants within the context of the national struggle. In that sense one may 
speak of Chechen Islamic nationalism. By referring back to a past involving 
Islamism and the independence movement, Chechen Islamists are adapting 
jihadist Islamism to new territory. The creation of an Islamist state could then 
. It was first used in reference 
to the 19th century Caucasus Wars, and later during the first Russo-Chechen 
war. 
                                               
11. Alfred Morabia, Le Gihad dans l’islam médiéval, Paris, Albin Michel, 1993, pp. 96 and 
110. 
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appear to be an objective which, by reinforcing Chechen society, will also 
promote its autonomy.  
In the same way that the idea of jihad developed by Palestinian Islamists 
suggests not so much a religious agenda as a way of incorporating the national 
struggle into a religious eschatology – the main objective remaining the 
territory’s independence –, it seems that for the Chechens this notion should be 
interpreted more in the context of the past and its glorification. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of the national struggle within this set of references links this 
specific form of resistance to other examples of resistance through a criss-
crossing chain of identification which has helped Chechnya break out of its 
isolation, both symbolically and in its attempts to raise funds.  
 
The limited impact of internationalist jihadist groups  
 
For certain – mainly Arab – international jihadist groups, Chechnya is a 
substitute for Afghanistan. The ideology developed by such groups has turned 
the Russo-Chechen conflict, like Palestine, into a zone of opposition between 
oppressed Muslims and infidels. However, they remain very limited in number 
in relation to the entire Chechen resistance movement; and while their 
propaganda routinely refers to Chechnya, it is mainly aimed at an Arab Muslim 
public. The extent of their impact has depended on links to local combatant 
groups and on territorializing their references, in other words on how well they 
adapt to what is at stake locally. 
 
The impact and tactics of armed Wahhabi groups in Chechnya 
 
The first jihadist groups arrived in Chechnya during the first war between 1994 
and 1996. Before their arrival, the neo-fundamentalist Wahhabi doctrine had 
spread in Dagestan under the influence of a Dagestani preacher named 
Kebedov12. Dagestani villages had turned Wahhabi and adopted the Sharia. 
The term Wahhabi, referring to Wahhabism13
                                               
12. Mikhaïl Roshin, chapter cited, p. 138. 
13. Wahhabism grew out of an alliance between a tribal clan, the Sauds, and a religious 
reformer, Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792). See Olivier Roy, L’Islam mondialisé, Paris, Le Seuil, 
2002, p. 136. 
, a highly conservative form of 
Sunnism and the official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia, is often rejected by 
such individuals themselves, who see it as an oversimplification of their 
doctrine and too specific a link with Saudi Arabia. The term Salafist is 
generally used by jihadist groups, although it is not certain that this is 
widespread in Chechnya. Salafism is an idea that was created in the late 19th 
century. The term itself comes from salaf (‘‘pious ancestor’’) andthe trend 
grew out of a desire to return to a purer form of Islam by referring directly to 
the original texts and by adopting the same lifestyle as the prophet. This 
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‘‘return’’ had a political dimension through its resolve to challenge 
colonialism14. Political positions within the Salafist movement are extremely 
varied, with the jihadist faction merely one of its more extreme forms15
Thus the Wahhabis firmly established themselves through their military 
successes, and their Islamist discourse was only meaningful in reference to the 
struggle. For a Chechen combatant, choosing an armed group was more a 
function of proximity and renown than of ideological orientation. Their 
relationship to religious practices fluctuated
. 
Theories attempting to explain how such doctrines took root usually highlight 
the usefulness of a form of identification allowing for differentiation from and 
opposition to the Russians in the post-Soviet context. With respect to 
Chechnya, there are two different dimensions through which these groups have 
taken a position in local conflicts and thereby gained an impact – through their 
contribution to the national struggle and their challenging of traditional 
structures in organizations they were representing. 
 
Integration in the struggle against the Russians  
Indeed, these combatants perceived above all as foreign extremists by the 
Chechens, were not at all well liked at first. Nevertheless, their alliances with 
Chechen warlords, the most famous being the one sealed between Basayev and 
Khattab, a Saudi Arabian Wahabbi and former combatant in Afghanistan, have 
afforded them a certain measure of integration. This alliance clearly shows 
their determination to join together with effective groups and to obtain outside 
financing. As for Khattab, this local ‘‘sponsorship’’ was essential for him 
because the involvement of his combatants was not well accepted by the 
population. However, his success against the Russians in the field strengthened 
the position of his jihadists, and from that time on certain Chechen combatants 
began making Islamist references. Subsequently, their successes were widely 
broadcast through videotapes. During the first war, Basayev’s most famous 
military exploit was the February 1995 hostage-taking following a sortie which 
aimed to break through the Russian army encircling the Chechens and advance 
two hundred kilometres to the north of Chechnya. During negotiations the 
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announced the end of Russian 
operations. Although the ceasefire did not hold, it gave the Chechen resistance 
time to take in the new combatants from the villages destroyed by the Russian 
army. That type of operation gave particular visibility to this group of 
combatants, who nevertheless constituted a minority among the Chechen troops 
led by Maskhadov. They are estimated to have been three or four thousand in 
number during this period. 
16
                                               
14. Olivier Roy, op. cit., p. 133. 
15. On this point, Olivier Roy, op. cit., p. 141. 
16. Chechnya Committee, op. cit., p. 36 and Christoph Zuercher, Institutionen und 
organisierte Gewalt : Konflikt und Stabilitätsdynamiken im (post-)sowjetischen Kaukasus, p. 
36. 
. And the opposition between 
Sufism and Salafism, which was nevertheless one of the things at stake for 
foreign combatant groups, held little meaning for the young people who joined 
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such groups and found themselves surrounded by Islamist references linked to 
the national struggle.  
 
Challenging local authorities? 
More or less united with the rest of the Chechen resistance during the first war, 
these Islamist combatant groups were involved in the extreme division of 
power in post-war Chechnya. Indeed, their position was threatened within 
Chechen society. The population favoured negotiating with the Russians and 
was eager to believe in the accords signed. As the Islamist’s presence in the 
Chechen resistance was disproportionate to their real impact on the population, 
the end of the war signalled a loss of power for them. The desire to maintain 
their position manifested itself through two forms of opposition, on the one 
hand within the independence movement against Maskhadov, who vacillated 
between compromise and rejection, and on the other hand against the 
traditional authorities and the Sufi hierarchy. Their position here was not so 
much a specificity of the Chechen Islamist movements as a standard attitude of 
warlords eager to maintain their power by carving out fiefdoms - sometimes 
linked to the criminal world - within which they refused to obey the main 
authority, in this case Maskhadov. In parallel to that refusal, the Islamists also 
opposed the local Sufi authorities. 
As for the authorities themselves, they struggled against the combatants, 
challenging the strength they derived from taking part in the war. They sought 
to keep them out of the villages to avoid Russian reprisals against civilians. In 
general they developed an attitude of compromise with the Russians rather than 
armed struggle, illustrated particularly well by the fate of Kadyrov, the former 
mufti who ran the pro-Russian Chechen administration from June 2000. In that 
sense, the authorities constitute a form of opposition to the Islamic nationalists. 
For the jihadists, there is the added desire to reform Sufi Islam, considered 
degenerate by comparison with a pure, original Islam. This opposition led to 
violent internal clashes in July 1998. Within this context, Maskhadov tried in 
vain to expel the Wahhabis from Chechnya. He obtained no assistance from the 
Russians.  
The Chechen Islamists then proceeded to carry out what could be called both 
an ideological and a strategic U-turn by strengthening their alliance with the 
Dagestani Wahhabis. An Islamist congress of Dagestani and Chechen Islamists 
had been formed in 1997. In 1998 it created an armed division to be led by 
Basayev. Ideologically speaking, it manifested far greater determination to 
establish an imamate connected to Shamil. In strategic terms this alliance 
highlighted a desire for opposition, and clearly led the Islamists to overestimate 
their influence on the people. Furthermore, the ties between Dagestan and 
Chechnya prompted them to take into account other aspects at stake such as the 
conflict between the Wahhabis and the Dagestani government. In August 1999, 
several hundred combatants commanded by Basayev and Khattab entered 
Dagestan to ‘‘liberate’’ it and help form an Islamic state united with Chechnya. 
But the Islamists greatly underestimated the people’s opposition to their 
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movement and were faced with local resistance in addition to attacks by the 
Russian army. 
That incident marked the most extreme point in the gap between the Islamists’ 
ideas and the Chechen population. While striving to maintain their position, the 
Islamists were forced to take things even further. They had a double interest in 
the situation in Chechnya remaining unstable. First, their influence in the 
resistance movement – due to their considerable resources – gave them a more 
important role to play. Secondly, their ideology was only meaningful to people 
during times of conflict, particularly when conflict intensified and there 
appeared to be no other way of settling the situation.  
Beyond their effective participation in armed groups, what was the Islamists’ 
exact ideological posture? 
 
Which ideological discourse? 
 
One cannot talk about one Islamist discourse in Chechnya, since there are 
several of them dealing with different issues. Roughly, one could say that 
references to Islam in Chechnya are threefold: a traditional Sufi Islam which is 
also involved in the organization of society, an Islamic nationalism, and a 
jihadist Islamism backed by foreigners. The three discourses are different, as 
are the leaders of these three trends and their positions on the national struggle. 
However, these distinctions are not necessarily meaningful to their rank-and-
file militants who shift from one to the other. Despite the use of the same 
vocabulary, a distinct gap is apparent between the discourse developed around 
Chechnya by the international jihadist movement and that of local Chechen 
Islamists found on the internet, on videotapes, in declarations made by their 
leaders, etc. Nonetheless, while one may jump from a territorialized discourse 
on independence to a de-territorialized discourse with jihadists, the one 
constant always advanced is the notion of ‘‘martyrdom’’ and the capacity for 
sacrifice.  
For the jihadists, Chechnya has no regional or historical specificity and is 
merely a place illustrating the oppression of Muslims by kuffar. As in Palestine, 
it has been used a- posteriori to develop that theory and to legitimize their 
position by showing the struggle against the abuses of the Russian army in 
Chechnya. One can distinguish the ‘‘non-specialized’’ jihadist websites, in 
which Chechnya and Palestine constitute the central – but not the only – 
themes, from those specifically concerned with Chechnya. 
In addition to the websites, Azzam, generally thought to be Al Qaida’s 
publishing house, has brought out a CD-Rom on Chechnya in Arabic showing 
the wartime atrocities and Chechen ambushes against the Russians with a 
number of personal accounts and wills from mujahidin. Videotapes of 
ambushes led by Basayev and Khattab in Chechnya are also being circulated. 
This type of media is important because websites are often inaccessible. 
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In these documents, particularly in the wills of kamikazes and bequeathed 
videotapes17
Female martyrdom is featured on the website www.qoqaz.com. Piety and the 
shahidats’ capacity for sacrifice are highlighted: ‘‘I know what I’m doing, 
paradise has its price and I hope it will be the price of paradise. Hawaa 
Barayev, the sword of jihad.’’ A ten-page document explains the specific role 
women can play within the framework of jihad
, the Russians are presented as kuffar. But the issue of Chechen 
independence is not the main theme. The videos, photographs and accounts 
stressing the horror of war, lingering over images of the dead and wounded, 
and showing the combatants in action are juxtaposed with verses from the 
Koran. Next to photographs of dead “martyrs” is the text: ‘‘Do not think that 
those killed on the path of Allah are dead. On the contrary, they are living with 
their God, very well provided for.’’ (Koran III, 169). Similarly, the wills stress 
the relationship to Allah and jihad, with no mention of the Chechen question.  
18. This glorification of women 
is always to the detriment of men who have not joined the fight: ‘‘A great 
many women are now taking part in jihad and I hope that the men will also 
participate in jihad and not take on the women’s role by staying at home.[...] 
Our ancestors would have killed anyone who tried to touch their wives, but 
Muslim women are now being attacked and raped in front of those who call 
themselves men, and they care so little about the honour of their Muslim sisters 
that they sit there drinking tea while listening to such appalling news’’19
In contrast to these general invocations, the documents shown on the 
kavkazcenter website run by the Chechen Udugov – who also has a television 
channel which he now runs from Qatar –, as well as those on ‘‘martyrdom 
operations’’, are in Russian rather than Arabic; and their discourse is centred 
around the need to liberate Chechnya. This is the specific framework within 
which jihad is referred to. One example is this declaration made by the 
hostage-takers at a Moscow theatre
. 
20
                                               
17. To quote only a descriptive summary of certain videos in Arabic: Chechnya, the 
destruction of a nation (December 1999) shows attacks against civilians, the systematic 
destruction of non-military targets by Russian forces, and amputated young children and 
babies; Massacre in Chechnya (October 1999) shows massacres perpetrated against women 
and children by Russian forces; Jihad in Dagestan shows attacks by the jihad in August and 
September 1999, when Chechen mujahidin went to help their Muslim comrades in Dagestan. 
18. To take part in combat if the local commander decides the struggle is such that women 
must participate, to support the combatants in the battlefield, to raise mujahidin children, to 
engage in physical training, to urge loved ones to take part in jihad, and to study military 
medical practices. 
19. Excerpt from a text presenting itself as an English transcription of a video entitled No 
Surrender ! It is a dialogue between two women, Hawwaa and Luiza, preparing to commit a 
suicide attack, and their instructor. The document, initially featured on the website 
www.qoqaz.com, can be found on www.terrorisme.net. This website, as well as 
www.religioscope.com, is run by Jean-François Mayer, a professor at the University of 
Fribourg. 
20. On 23 October 2002 a Chechen commando took several hundred spectators hostage. 
Russian special forces stormed the building using paralysing gas. All members of the 
commando were killed, as were numerous hostages. 
, broadcast on Al-Jazeera: ‘‘We have 
come to the capital to end the war and attain martyrdom here through the path 
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of Allah. We demand an end to the war and the withdrawal of Russian 
forces.[...] Every nation has a right to self-determination, but Russia has taken 
that right away from the Chechen people and today we want to take back that 
right granted us – and to all other nations – by Allah the Most Gracious, the 
right to freedom and self-determination. The Russian occupants have flooded 
our country with our children’s blood and we have waited a long time for a fair 
solution [by appealing to] human consciences, but the world is living in a coma 
and doesn’t care about the assassination of innocents.[...] That is why we have 
chosen this path – the path of jihad for the liberty of the Chechen people.’’21
There are two opposing discourses. On the one hand, de-territorialized 
jihadism, and on the other hand, ethnic nationalism evolving towards Islamic 
nationalism. The two kinds of discourse are not intended for the same audience. 
Jihadist sites broadcasting mainly in Arabic and English are mainly targeting 
an Arab-Muslim audience
. 
22. The same type of competition was found in 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon between Islamic nationalism – in movements 
such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad in this case – and the Salafists’ jihadist 
Islamism. When the mosques were taken over by Islamic nationalist 
movements such as Hamas, it was perceived as a way of preventing jihadist 
movements from taking root23
An evolving range of actions and the increase in suicide bombings 
. 
Although somewhat modified by Islamic nationalism, Chechen nationalism’s 
significant influence limits the extent to which jihadist ideology can take root 
in the country, even if some figures from this movement are present. Islamist 
ideas are only meaningful for them through an association with the national 
struggle and its reinterpretation. 
 
 
Is the evolution towards Islamic nationalism a key element in understanding 
the adoption of a range of actions including suicide bombings? The latter use 
                                               
21. A French translation of these declarations can be seen on www.terrorisme.net: Prise 
d’otages à Moscou (26 octobre 2002). 
22. An example of the impact of this kind of discourse on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 
1999, in the context of clashes with the Lebanese army, has been analysed by Bernard 
Rougier: ‘‘A sizeable part of this group became literally immersed in jihadist Islamism, 
identifying itself with the population of Grozny suffering daily bombings by Russian troops. 
The timing and the place for the fighting were synchronised with the destruction of Grozny by 
the Russian troops, and in the feverish minds of those following the fighting in Aïn el-Héloué, 
the struggle against the Lebanese army was indeed an extension of the Checehn jihad against 
the Russian army.’’ Bernard Rougier, Reconstructions identitaires et mobilisations religieuses 
dans les camps de réfugiés palestiniens au Liban depuis la fin de la guerre (1990-2001), 
thesis, Paris, Institut d’études politiques, 2002, pp. 354-355. A young Palestinian from the 
camp even committed a suicide attack against the Russian Embassy in Beirut (Rougier, ibid., 
pp. 355-360). 
23. Bernard Rougier, ‘‘Religious dynamics and national identity in Palestinian refugee camps 
in Lebanon’’, in Jean-Francois Legrain, (dir.), ‘‘Waiting for Palestine’’, Maghreb-Machreq, 
n 176, September 2003. 
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the shahid, or Muslim martyr, as a reference, and in that respect the link might 
appear quite clear. Suicide bombings are more characteristic of the second war, 
particularly in 2003. From 2000 to 2003, the Russo-Chechen war was defined 
on the Russian side by an intensification of methods of massive repression24 as 
well as widespread corruption. On the Chechen side, the resistance movement 
was divided. The people were at the end of their tether. The legitimacy of the 
pro-Russian administration, already very weak, was not strengthened by the 
March 2003 referendum, which was widely contested. Furthermore, the 
combatants clashed over which methods to employ. While ambushes and 
guerrilla warfare remained the main mode of action, bombings and suicide 
attacks increased despite Maskhadov’s disavowal. Other kinds of operations 
associated with the idea of martyrdom had been carried out by the Chechens in 
the past. The main mode of action during the first war therefore consisted of 
ambushes against the Russian army. However, certain very highrisk attacks 
designed to help fighters break out of encirclement were presented as suicide 
attacks. Moreover, some combatants in Islamist battalions celebrated their 
funerals before going into combat25. Nevertheless, it cannot be called suicide in 
a literal sense except when volunteers were sent over minefields, as in Iran26, to 
allow the main combatants to get out of Grozny under siege. There, they were 
sure to die. In the two other cases, they used tactics aimed at turning apparently 
desperate situations around where there was still a chance for survival27
It seems impossible to establish a direct causal link between the increase in 
suicide bombings and the evolution towards Islamic nationalism, or at least to 
attribute full responsibility to Islamist organizations in Chechnya. Since the 
resumption of the conflict, responsibility for the bombings generally was 
claimed by Basayev until his death in July 2006.. But two types of operations 
must be distinguished. Some, like the taking of hostages at the Moscow theatre, 
require a great deal of organization, while others – isolated acts with simple 
targets – seem to be carried out by relatively unorganized individuals
.  
28
                                               
24. On 11 April 2003, Le Monde published an article concerning a report from pro-Russian 
Chechen authorities sent to ‘‘the highest level of State’’ (i.e. Vladimir Putin). This 
unpublished document mentioned among other things the execution of one hundred civilians 
per month throughout 2002, nearly three thousand corpses found in mass graves, kidnappings 
and torture. On 17 April, the Chechen Prime Minister, Anatoli Popov, declared that it was not 
a ‘‘secret report’’ but rather the results of an inquiry led by the Chechen state prosecutor 
Viktor Kravtchenko. According to him, the text actually mentions three hundred civilian 
kidnappings involving Russian soldiers, some of whom are already serving time. 
25. Brian Williams, ‘‘Unraveling the links between the Middle East and Islamic militants in 
Chechnya’’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 12 February 2003, p. 2. 
26. Farhad Khosrokhavar, L’Islamisme et la Mort, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995. 
27. For Hamit Bozarslan, eliminating the idea of risk in suicide attacks, in which death is 
certain, is a crucial aspect in the development of sacrificial violence. Hamit Bozarslan, From 
Political Contest to Self-Sacrifice: Violence in the Middle East, Princeton, Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2004. 
28. Laurent Vinatier, ‘‘Prospective reflections on the political evolution of Chechnya’’, 
Round table discussion on Chechnya, EHESS-IISMM, 5 May 2003. 
. It is 
unlikely, for example, that Basayev had any real hold over the latter. These acts 
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are carried out by Chechens, and surely not by international jihadist militants. 
The first suicide attacks using truck bombs were perpetrated in July 2000; but 
the true intensification and exportation of this mode of action on Russian 
territory began in December 2002. Nonetheless, the Russian army in Chechnya 
and the pro-Russian Chechen administration were the targets of the majority of 
bomb attacks. This specificity highlights the extent to which Chechen society 
was divided. One of the bombings targeted Kadyrov, the head of the 
administration29
These diverse elements tend to reinforce the theory of local appropriation of 
acts such as suicide bombings, which indeed developed through the notion of 
sacrifice for the cause, and the shahid, but they cannot be considered as the 
result of indoctrination based on the person’s isolation. Moreover, Chechens 
tend to distance themselves from the jihadist discourse and consider the Islamic 
nationalists’ violence as a form of revenge, the weak man’s weapon. The 
suicide attacks committed by women are associated with the idea of ‘‘sacrifice, 
not in the name of any doctrine, but as an act of revenge or a way of taking 
justice into one’s own hands since one cannot count on the judicial system, nor 
on help from anyone. Isolation and abandonment by the international 
community are mentioned constantly.’’
.  
30
There are some striking analogies here to the case of Palestine, where 
prospective suicide bombers for the second Intifada (contrary to those in 1994-
1996), far from being seasoned militants from organizations, were recruited in 
a much more widespread fashion and often went to the organizations 
themselves when ready to take action. The same intensification of religious 
. 
The history of these women confirms this. People talk of ‘‘war widows’’, and 
there is always a deceased husband, brother or other relative to justify their 
desire for revenge. Although these women are increasingly religious, according 
to Bleuenn Isambard, ‘‘the young women who died at the Nord-Ost Theatre in 
Moscow in October 2002, and others who blew themselves up against Russian 
targets – or tried to, more or less successfully – were for the most part 
‘‘modern’’, educated young women who did not belong to extremist 
movements. Some were clearly ‘‘manipulated’’ or used as tools, while others 
decided on their own and made the move alone, or nearly so.[...] Those who 
were willing to commit such deeds – and even the acts themselves – were 
appropriated after the fact. The willingness to commit such acts is therefore not 
the result of indoctrination, but clearly the person’s own decision, which is 
subsequently reinforced and supported, at times by those around him/her, and 
through religious interpretations stressing the value of sacrifice. The main 
motivation seems linked on the one hand to a desire to avenge a close relative, 
and on the other hand to the general context of the situation in Chechnya which 
is perceived as devoid of hope.  
                                               
29. The bomb attack on 14 May 2003 carried out during a religious celebration seemed to be 
targeting Ahmed Kadyrov. There were fifteen deaths and one hundred and forty wounded. 
Sources disagree about whether it was a suicide attack by one or two women, or a bomb 
which had been placed inside a loudspeaker. 
30. Interview with Bleuenn Isambard upon his return from Chechnya in the summer of 2003. 
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practices took place a few weeks prior to the event. But, contrary to what has 
occurred in other contexts, the organization did not have to isolate the 
individuals, who continued to live in their everyday environment up to the last 
day. As in the case of Chechnya, the suicide bombers in Israel are not recruited 
from a specific environment, and definitely not from a particularly poor or 
underprivileged one by the standards of the society as a whole. The Chechen 
and Palestinian cases are indeed similar, as they both contain broad social 
breeding-grounds which have been more or less exploited by these 
organizations, although not created by them. Despair resulting from 




In parallel with the increase in suicide bombings in Chechnya, the use of 
religious vocabulary has become more pronounced in talking about the 
conflict, along with the highlighting of combatants’ religious practices – 
beginning with the ‘‘martyrdom’’ of the suicide bombings. But this does not 
necessarily reflect any influence from international jihadism. First, one must 
underline the heritage of past struggles dating back to the 19th century, when 
Islam was closely tied to anti-colonialism. The use of references from 
international jihadism indicating Chechnya to be a hotbed ofkuffar oppression 
of Muslims is only meaningful if associated with the plan for national 
liberation in Chechnya. The Islamists’ main impact has been through their 
battalions’ exploits, and through a subsequent association – for the time being – 
with a heroic (but also extremist) image. Conversely, their attempts to change 
values within Chechen society and their opposition to traditional structures 
have alienated a segment of the population. However, this may also afford 
them some credibility with the younger generation, to whom they represent a 
chance for social advancement and greater power.  
Although the reference to martyrdom provides a framework for legitimizing 
suicide bombings, these mainly grow out of a desire for revenge, of a personal 
nature in most cases – suicide attacks against the general who killed one’s 
brother, for example –, and as such could potentially find wider support among 
the Chechen population. That same aspect of revenge – a list of names could be 
mentioned in a will – is present in Palestinian kamikazes; but injecting the 
notion of an eschatological jihad adds a temporal dimension which allows the 
lost national struggle to be recast with very long-term prospects for victory. 
That aspect seems to be missing from the Chechen equation, perhaps which 
perhaps confirms a weaker ideological link between suicide attacks and the 
Islamic nationalist reinterpretation of the struggle31
                                               
31. It would have been impossible to write this chapter without the conversations I had with Bleuenn Isambard, 
Uwe Halbach, Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Frédérique Longuet-Marx, Silvia Serrano, Mairbek Vatchagaev and 
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